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PROBLEMS OF SURFACE DAMAGE
By ROBERT C. HAWLEY Of the Denver Bar
Robert C. Hawley; Member, Colo-
rado and Denver Bar Association;
A.B., University of Colorado, 1953;
L.LB., Harvard University, 1949;
presently, Attorney for Continental
Oil Company and Subsidiaries.
Member of Oil and Gas Committee,
Colorado Bar Association, Junior
Bar, Committee Denver Bar Asso-
ciation, Rocky Mountain Oil and
Gas Association, Wyoming Petro-
leum Industries Committee, Wyo-
ming Stock Growers Association,
American National Cattlemen's As-
sociation.
In order to define the subject, it should be made clear that
excepting certain minor variations the context of surface damages
will be limited to those problems which occur when the person
allegedly damaging the surface is conducting operations on lands
upon which he is entitled to access by virtue of a valid oil and
gas lease. There shall be no attempts to discuss the problem of
damage to the surface of other lands or problems not directly con-
nected with operations which might be governed in certain states
by the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher or absolute liability rather
than liability based upon negligence.
The problem of surface damages is becoming increasingly im-
portant to the Rocky Mountain Region due to the great increase
in oil activities during the past few years. Oil and gas attorneys
have experienced increased frequency with respect to surface
damage problems.
From time to time the subject has been mentioned as a matter
for federal legislation. It has been approached in one of two ways;
the surface owner should be granted by law a certain percent of
the royalty received by the mineral owner and the working in-
terest owner. It is not believed that a conveyance of this type
would solve the problem because once the surface owner acquired
this right, there would be no restriction upon his reserving it to
himself if he conveyed the surface or conveyed the royalty to a
grantee even though he retained the surface for himself. In either
event, the resulting situation would be no different than initially.
The second proposal is that when a mineral owner leases, the
surface owner be given some interest similar to an overriding roy-
alty during the existence of the lease. It is possible that where a
person having no interest in the mineral estate is by law granted
certain property rights belonging to the mineral owner and the
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oil operator, due process considerations may arise. Since neither
solution would be of any value to the surface owner in the absence
of production, adoption of one or the other would be only a partial
solution.
In the last session of the Wyoming Legislatuire, a bill was in-
troduced to give the surface owner a 2 % royalty on all State
of Wyoming Oil and Gas Leases. The bill did not pass.
The Wyoming Stockgrower's Association and the Colorado
Cattlemen's Association have been very active in their efforts to
obtain some type of compensation for the surface owner. Re-
cently, the Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas Association and the Wyom-
ing Stockgrower's Association have formulated a code of ethics
under which the members of both groups are working to obtain
a "Gentlemen's Agreement" with respect to the rights and the
protection of the parties involved. An understanding of this type
will, if successful, undoubtedly do more toward solving the problem
than any other measure. Unfortunately, human passions enter
into the situation all too frequently and regardless of the initial
intention of the parties, hard feelings arise, often times resulting
in court actions and sometimes even in violence.
For a full understanding of the problem, it is well to remember
that there are two distinct and separate estates involved; (1) the
surface estate, and (2) the mineral estate. Few people would
seriously contest the right of a property owner to have access to
his property across surrounding property of another. The separate
mineral and surface estates can be compared analagously. The
mineral owner must have access upon the surface of the lands
overlying his mineral estate in order to fully realize his property.
Since a realization of such hydrocarbons is normally accomplished
by virtue of the owner granting a lease to some oil operator for
the purposes of exploration and development, the general types
of leases employed shall be considered:
(1) The Fee Lease, normally one of the various types of
"Producers 88."
(2) Federal Oil and Gas Leases which are of many types,
the differentiation between which will not be elab-
orated.
(3) State Oil and Gas Leases.
The typical Fee Lease usually contains the following type
clause:
"Lessee shall have the right to use, free of cost, gas, oil,
and water produced on said land for its operations thereon,
except water from wells of lessor. When requested by
lessor, lessee shall bury his pipeline below plow depth.
No wells shall be drilled nearer than 200 feet to the house
or barn now on said premises, without the written consent
of the lessor. Lessee shall pay for damages caused by its
operations to growing crops on said land. Lessee shall have
the right at any time to remove all improvements, machin-
ery, and fixtures placed or erected by lessee on said prem-
ises, including the right to pull and remove casing."
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The first situation to be considered is that where the surface
and minerals are vested in the same person. This situation usually
does not create too much of a problem, because the lessor is quite
anxious to further the development of his property for oil and gas
purposes. Consequently he favors any necessary measures that
the lessee must take in the conduct of exploration, drilling and
producing operations. Unfortunately, there are times when even
the best of friends "fall out." This often happens when the hoped
for well is dry and the expected royalties are not forthcoming.
There are also instances in which the lessor and lessee do not get
along even though the lease may be on producing property. The
law on this particular point is brought out in a recent Texas case
decided by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.1 The lessor also
owned the surface and the lease contained a clause such as that
quoted above. The lessee periodically cleaned gas wells located
on the property by "blowing" them. On one particular occasion,
the lessee blew the gas wells and an arsenic compound was de-
posited on the lessor's land. The lessor brought an action for dam-
ages to grass, land, livestock and fencing. The jury awarded the
lessor a verdict of $15,000. In affirming the judgment notwith-
standing the verdict, the Court held that the lessor had to prove
negligence on the part of the lessee; that there was no negligence;
that the arsenic compound was not a foreseeable consequence of
cleaning a gas well by blowing; that the operator had acted with
reasonable diligence and in a proper fashion; and that the damage
was only to grass which is not a crop.
A much more troublesome problem arises when the mineral
lessor is not the surface owner. This occurs when the mineral
estate presumably has been severed from the surface estate by
reservation or conveyance. (It is commonplace in real estate law
that more consideration is paid for a property which has been im-
proved by sidewalks, curbs, gutters and other structures of this
type than for the same property if unimproved. This is such a
generally recognized fact that no one would argue otherwise. Yet,
if this same problem is transferred to a potentially valuable min-
eral property, loud repercussions are often heard.) Even in un-
explored areas, mineral rights have some value, as evidenced by
the fact when a ranch is purchased with the mineral rights re-
served to the grantor, the amount a purchaser pays for the property
is considerably less than it would be if the purchase included the
mineral rights. The value of minerals is often forgotten, however,
when the owner of the severed mineral estate attempts to recover
his property. The courts, however, have with great consistency
held that the mineral estate was the dominant estate and that
the owner thereof had the right to recover his property.
The rule is set forth in the California case of MacDonnell v.
Capitol Company.' In this case, the minerals had been reserved
by a prior grantor. The surface owner brought an action for
damages claiming trespass. The court denied the claim and held
that a mineral reservation is construed in favor of the grantor;
'Wohiford v. American Gas Production Co., 218 F2d 213 (1955).
130 F2d 311 (1942).
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that there is unanimity as to the rule that the minerals may be
removed even though the surface of the land may be wholly de-
stroyed. Of course, the removal must be done in a manner con-
sistent with proper oil field practice. This principle is also set
forth in Thornton, The Law of Oil and Gas, Vol. 1, Sec. 342.
Often, the very interesting question is asked, "How can a min-
eral owner as lessor enter into a contract obligation with an oil
operator as lessee under which contract the operator is granted
certain rights to the surface when the lessor does not own the
surface." The principle objective of a severed mineral owner is to
capture his mineral property. In attempting to do this there are
undoubtedly many occasions when he pays little heed to what
use is made of the surface; he will grant any privileges requested
by the operator insofar as they pertain to the use of the surface.
In Wood v. Hay,3 it was very ably argued that there was nothing
in a mineral reservation expressly giving the right to drill wells,
erect derricks, construct tanks or make use of the surface in ex-
ploring for oil and gas. In rejecting this argument, the court said,
"The right to enter and to make reasonable use of the land in
achieving in a workmanlike way, the only result the parties could
have intended must be implied from the nature of the matters
dealt with."
The argument that the mineral owner must extract his minerals
in a way which is not inconsistent with the surface use was con-
sidered in Trklja v. Keys,4 . The California court held that there
was no basis for such a rule. Even in very unusual cases the courts
have established a pattern which can be followed with little dif-
ficulty. Among the most unusual is Vodopija v. Gulf Refining Co.,'
a decision of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. The defendant
had been granted a Louisiana state oil and gas lease. The plain-
tiff had been granted a Louisiana state oyster lease. Under the
terms of the oil and gas lease, the defendant was granted privi-
leges, "reasonably requisite" for the conduct of its operations.
The Gulf Company, in conducting offshore operations over the
ocean bottom, covered by both the oil and gas and the oyster
lease, disturbed the oyster beds and thus greatly reduced the value
of the plaintiff's lease. Plaintiff brought an action for damages.
175 S.W. 2d 190 (1943).
121 P. 2d, 54 (1942).
198 F. 2d, 344 (1952),
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The court held that the plaintiff must prove negligence and that
if the defendant conducted its oil operations in a normal manner,
there was no negligence even if damage had been done. This doc-
trine is carried even further in the Oklahoma case of Phillips Petro-
leum Company v. Sheel,6 . Three head of plaintiff's cattle were
killed by the pump jacks on the defendant's, Phillips, wells. Phil-
lips was conducting operations under an Osage Indian lease which
contained the following language:
"During operations the lessee shall pay all damages for
the use of the surface, other than that included in tle loca-
tion and tank sites, all damages to any growing crops or
any improvements on the lands and all other damages as
may be occasioned by reason of operations."
It was Sheel's contention that all other damages occasioned by
reason of operations covered the loss of his cattle. The court,
however, held that the language did not cover the loss of the
cattle. It was the court's opinion that the damages provided for
in the quoted language of the lease were only damages to crops
and improvements and that recovery could be had for the loss of
livestock only when there was proof of negligence. The language
"all other damages" was held to apply only to damages to crops
and improvements. As there was no negligence on the part of
Phillips, the operations having been conducted in a normal fashion,
no recovery was allowed. This was a reiteration of the rule pre-
viously set forth in Mid-Continent Petroleum Corporation v.
Rhodes,7 another Oklahoma case in which the plaintiff's cattle
died from drinking from a slush pit. The court denied recovery
under the provisions of the oil and gas lease on the ground that
compensation will only be allowed for damages to crops and im-
provements and that livestock could not be placed in either of
these categories.
The above-cited cases establish the rule that any reasonable
use may be made of the surface if it is necessary to obtain the
dominant mineral estate. What then is a reasonable use? Bordieu
v. Seaboard Oil Corporation,8 was a case in which the California
court held that the right of a mineral lessee cannot be enlarged
by the terms of the lease. This would appear to mean that the
mineral lessee has a right only to operate on the surface and to
extract the minerals. However, this holding is no panacea but is
only the first milestone. It is assumed that the oil operator can-
not go beyond the rights necessary to extract minerals and that
these rights cannot be enlarged by the lease. The ultimate ques-
tion is one of defining such rights. In some jurisdictions, certain
rights are included which are specifically excluded in others. Con-
sequently, the attorney handling a case involving surface damages
must complete the general outline by attempting to determine
what the rights include within the jurisdiction involved. The facts
in the Bordieu case were that the oil operator was using the sur-
*243 P2d, 726 (1952).
T240 P2d 95 (1951).
$119 P2d, 973 (1941).
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face covered by the claimant's lease as a site for processing oil
which had been produced on other leases a good distance away.
The court held that this was not a right granted in the lease and
was an attempted enlargement of such rights.
In Coffindaffer v. Hope Natural Gas Company," the West
Virginia court rendered a decision indicating what is an unrea-
sonable use. The oil operator built a road on the premises for the
purpose of exploring and drilling for oil and gas. The road was
built in good faith. However, no well was ever drilled and, con-
sequently, the court decided that the operator was liable for
restoring the land to the condition that it had been in prior to the
construction of the road. This case may still be the law in West
Virginia but it is extremely doubtful that it would still control
in other jurisdictions.
In the case of Yates v. The Gulf Oil Corporation,° Gulf
brought an action to restrain the surface owner for interfering with
geophysical operations on the leased premises. The lease under
which Gulf was operating had been granted in 1924 and speci-
fically permitted mining and operating for minerals. There was
no mention made in the lease of exploration or seismographing.
In fact, seismographing was completely unknown at the time of
the execution of the lease. The surface owner contended that be-
cause the lease was silent on these points, Gulf had no right to con-
duct exploration or seismograph activities. The court held that
Gulf had the right to send its seismograph crews on the premises
because exploration was an implied right and was reasonably
necessary for the purpose of oil and gas operations.
As in Bordieu v. Seaboard Oil Corporation, supra, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals in a case arising in Montana," held that
an oil and gas lease does not grant a right to use the premises for
operations pertaining to oil produced on other leases. In the Franz
case the lease provided that payment should be made for damages
to growing crops, fences, and other damages. The court used the
"reasonably necessary" test which has become the standard, but
allowed damages to the lessor because the lessee used a pump-
ing station on the leased premises for operations in another field.
0 81 SE 966 (19).
10 182 F2d, 286 (1950).
11 Franz Corporation v. Fifer, 295 Fed. 106 (1924).
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Interestingly, the court awarded damages based on the differ-
ences in value of the land before and after the operation. Uni-
formly, the decisions adopt the rule of damages as set forth in
Hatch Brothers v. Black, '2 a case decided by the Wyoming Su-
preme Court. The measure of damages adopted is the value of the
crops at the time of destruction, with the qualification, however,
that if operations are conducted reasonably, the operator is only
liable for temporary damages to the crops. If the operations are
conducted in an unreasonable manner, the operator is liable for
the entire amount as permanent damages.
Other guides to aid us in the determination of what is an un-
reasonable use of the surface are Livingston v. The Texas Company,
an unreported case decided in the Federal District Court for the
District of Wyoming, in which the plaintiff sought to recover
$75,000. Judge Kennedy stated that he could not award damages
for a reasonable use of the surface but that the plaintiff would
be allowed an amount of $5,000 by virtue of the Texas Company's
leaving casing, pipe, and other waste materials on the plaintiff's
alfalfa meadows; further, the company had interferred with the
plaintiff's irrigation system. Since the system, an improvement,
had not been restored to its former state, compensation was ordered
because of the damage to it.
In Fowler v. Delaplain," ' the Ohio court held that a lease
which granted the oil operator the right to use "necessary" meas-
ures for production and removal of oil and gas, did not apply to
houses constructed by the operator for its employees on the prop-
erty, because they were not necessary for operation and removal.
This holding is contra to the holding in Livingston v. Indian Terri-
tory Illuminating Oil Company,14 where the lease specifically
permitted the construction of buildings and other structures. The
Federal court held that buildings and other structures necessary
for operations included houses for employees. It might be well
argued that the distinction between the Fowler and Livingston
cases is explained by the difference in the language of the two
leases involved. However, in Joyner v. R. H. Dearing & Sons.1 5
a Texas case, the lease was silent as to any specific authorization
for construction of buildings or other structures. It was held that
the erection of a house and fence was reasonably necessary to the
full enjoyment of the right to produce oil from the premises:
consequently, the operator had this right even in the absence of
a specific authorization in the lease.
The opposing views expressed in Fowler v. Delaplain, and
Joyner v. R. H. Dearing & Sons, supra, do not upset what might
be termed as the "general rule" regarding surface operations
under fee leases. To summarize, it can be said that any measure
reasonably necessary for oil operations is permissible and that no
damages will be allowed. On the other hand, proof of negligent
conduct in the operations will result in liability and accompany-
- 165 P. 518, (1917).
" 87 NE 260.
1"91 Fed. 2d, 833 (1937).
134 S.W. 2d 757, (1939).
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ing damages. Damage to crops or improvements must usually
be compensated; this depends also upon the exact language of the
lease and any agreement between the parties like the oil and gas
leases executed by the Union Pacific Railroad Company.
The second type of lease to be discussed is the Federal Oil and
Gas Lease granted by the Federal Government in order that
operations may be conducted on lands under which the minerals
are owned by the United States. There were few problems in this
field until the passage of the Pickett Act in 1910. This act author-
ized the President of the United States to withdraw from entry
all public lands potentially valuable for oil and gas. Prior to this
time, mineral lands, or more specifically oil and gas lands, had
been open to location and acquisition under the placer mining laws.
Lands which had been opened to homestead entry had not been
burdened with mineral reservations and the homesteader, upon
successfully "proving up," acquired title to both the surface and
minerals. A new policy was embodied in the Mineral Leasing Act
of 1920, which laid the foundation for the procedure followed at
this time. In the period between the passage of the Pickett Act
in 1910, and the Mineral Leasing Act in 1920, there was a great
deal of confusion in the field of oil and gas development on fed-
eral lands due to a lack of clear cut policy. During this interim
period the Agricultural Entry Act of 1914 and the Stockraising
Homestead Act of 1916 were passed by the Congress of the United
States. Under the provisions of these, surface owners whose lands
overlaid a severed mineral estate were afforded some protection
from damage caused to their land by oil and gas operations. The
Agricultural Entry Act contained a provision that the oil and gas
lessee must secure a bond to compensate the surface owner for
damages to crops and improvements caused by prospecting. The
Act further went on to say that subsequent to prospecting the
lessee could re-enter and occupy so much of the surface as was
reasonably incident to his operations upon payment of damages
caused thereby to the surface owner. The terms of the Stock-
raising Homestead Act were clear in that the only payment of
damages allowed was compensation for damages to crops and
improvements. The terms of the 1914 Act gave rise to the problem
of whether or not compensation should be paid to a surface owner
Appraisals of Securities Free of Charge
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only for damages to crops and improvements or whether damages
to crops and improvements were payable as a result of prospect-
ing operations with compensation permitted for damages of any
type if further operations were conducted.
In Kinney Coastal Oil Company v. Kieffer," the Supreme
Court of the United States resolved this question by holding that
the intent of the Agricultural Entry Act of 1914 was to provide
for damages to crops and improvements only, regardless of whether
the damages occurred in prospecting or after re-entry during con-
duct of other oil and gas operations. As a result of this decision,
the damage provisions of the Agricultural Entry Act of 1914 and
the Stockraising Homestead Act of 1916 were determined to be
the same. Both acts require a bond in lieu of a waiver by the sur-
face owner or of a voluntary settlement of damages.
More recent federal legislation has gone somewhat further.
For example, the Strip and Open Pit Mining Act of 1949, makes
a mining operator liable for damages to lands used for grazing
purposes. It is doubtful that this in any way changes the situation
in regard to oil and gas operations because strip and open pit
mining operations are conducted in a completely different manner.
Another problem which arose under the Mineral Leasing Act
of 1920 was occasioned by the fact that the leases issued by the
United States granted the lessee many rights in addition to those
6277 US 488 (1927).
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which were specifically set forth in the statute. Proponents of
the argument that rights should be strictly limited to the terms
of the statute have been answered by the fact that the Mineral
Leasing Act allows the Secretary of the Interior to prescribe neces-
sary rules and regulations and to do any and all things necessary
to carry out and accomplish the purposes of the law. Forbes v.
United States17 and United States v. Ohio Oil Company,8 have held
that the secretary's rules and regulations should be given the ef-
fect of a statute in order fully to accomplish the purposes of the
law; therefore the rights granted to the lessee in the oil and gas
leases are valid. A contrary holding would, of course, have a tre-
mendous effect upon almost all federal oil and gas leases. This
effect would have gone beyond the problem of surface damages.
It is of importance to the surface damage question because so
many of the rights, such as those pertaining to transportation
and storage facilities, construction of various structures, roads,
etc., directly affect the surface owner. This effect was fully brought
out in a Montana case.' 9 The question involved in this action was
whether the building of a reservoir on the surface was reasonably
incident to oil and gas operations. The mineral estate had been
severed from the surface estate; the United States was the owner
of the mineral estate and granted a lease to the oil operator.
The court disallowed the plaintiff's claim for recovery on the
grounds that there was no proof that the reservoir was unneces-
sary and not reasonably incident to the oil and gas operations.
A more recent case involving surface damages where the
minerals have been reserved by the United States is Holbrook v.
Continental Oil Company20 which was rendered by the Supreme
Court of Wyoming. In this case, almost all of the points which
have been raised in actions regarding surface damages were con-
sidered. The lessee had attained a valid federal oil and gas lease
covering certain Wyoming ranch lands. At the time oil operations
were commenced on the leased premises, the plaintiffs were sur-
face lessees. During the period of oil and gas development the
plaintiffs purchased the surface as an addition to their ranch. The
following provisions were contained in the oil and gas leases
pertaining to the lessee's rights,
"right to drill for, mine, extract, remove and dispose of
all the oil and gas deposits in or under the lands, together
with the right to construct and maintain thereupon all
works, buildings, plants, waterways, roads, telephone and
telegraph lines, pipe lines, reservoir tanks, pumping sta-
tions or other structures necessary to the full enjoyment
thereof."
In the conduct of operations, the defendant constructed houses
for the use of its employees operating the lease, a battery, roads,
certain other structures, and, of course, drilled for oil. Plaintiffs
alleged that they were wrongly deprived of possession; that the
17 125 F2d 404 (1942).
18 163 F2d 633 (1947).
39 Norum v. The Queen City Oil Company, 264 P 122 (1928).
"278 P2d, 798 (1955).
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houses constructed were not necessary for the conduct of opera-
tions and that therefore they became the property of plaintiff who
was entitled to a sum equal to the rents which would have been
paid by tenants for such houses; that the oil operations destroyed
the plaintiff's integrated ranch unit; that defendants trod down
the grass crops, left oil and debris on the property, polluted the
water, destroyed the fences, left the gates open, built roads, cul-
verts, fills and dams upon the premises, transported people and
equipment across the lands; and further, that the defendant
stored, processed and handled oil and gas produced on other lands
upon plaintiff's lands; that the plaintiffs had been deprived of
full use and enjoyment of their property and that defendant's
operations had resulted in the death of some of the plaintiff's
livestock, had destroyed plaintiff's water supply and forced plain-
tiff's to construct a reservoir because of this destruction of the
water supply. For these damages, plaintiff sought a sum in ex-
cess of $35,000. All of the points involved were decided in favor
of defendants and on appeal, the Supreme Court of Wyoming
held:
1. The construction of the houses for defendant's employees
who operated the lease on a 24-hour basis was reasonably incident
to the oil operations, the facts showing that the nearest communi-
ties were Lance Creek, a distance of six to eight miles from the
lease, and Lusk, a distance of forty-two miles from the lease;
2. That the processing of oil in the tank battery on the plain-
tiff's premises, which oil was produced from an adjoining lease,
the surface of which was not owned by plaintiffs was not detri-
mental to plaintiffs in that another portion of the surface of the
adjoining lease was owned by plaintiffs and defendants would
have had a right to construct a tank battery thereon with the
result that there could have possibly been two tank batteries con-
sructed on the surface of plaintiff's lands rather than the one
which had been constructed; and
3. That there was no negligence in the conduct of defendant's
operations and that plaintiff's had not proved any damage to
crops and improvements which in the absence of negligence would
be their sole basis for recovery; the range grass not being a crop.
The last point as to whether native grass is a crop, which
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issue is of great importance to the Rocky. Mountain region, the
Supreme Courts of Wyoming, West Virginia, New Mexico, Texas,
Alabama and Oregon have held that various types of native
grasses are not a crop. The only authority which has been found
contrary is dictum in the Utah case of Francis v. Roberts,21 in which
the court stated "fructus industriales and fructus naturales are
comprehended within the term 'crops'." This case is, however,
of little force in that native hay was involved rather than range
grass and there was no dispute as to the fact that this hay was
harvested each year whereas range grasses are not mowed and
stacked.
Shortly after the decision in the Holbrook case supra, the
Wyoming legislature in 1955 passed the following act:
"For the purpose of interpreting the various laws of this
state, the term 'crop' or 'agricultural crop', when not other-
wise defined by Statute, shall be construed to mean corn,
oats, wheat, barley, flax, sorghums and other grains, po-
tatoes, vegetables, hay, wheat-grasses (agropyron species),
needlegrasses (stipa species), bluegrasses (poa species),
fescue grasses (festuca species), grama grasses (bouteloua
species), sedges and rushes, shrubby or woody forage plants
which include salt sages (atriplex species), sagebrushes (ar-
temisia species), winterfat (eurotia lanata), and forage
legumes which include astragalus, lupinus and other mem-
bers of the family leguminosae."
The effect of this piece of legislation is that at the present time
almost anything that grows in the state of Wyoming, including
sagebrush, is defined as a crop. Despite the language of the statute,
it is doubtful if it directly affects the Holbrook case in that the
statute applies to the many phases of Wyoming law where the
term "crop" is used without any definition thereof.
It would be a somewhat strained interpretation to apply a
definition which was designed to clarify state statutes to the
meaning of the word contained in a contract between two in-
dividual parties, especially in view of the fact that the word as
contained in such contract has been defined by a decision of the
Supreme Court of the state.
As to the third category of lease, namely the state lease, this
article shall confine itself only to a form used by the state of
Colorado.
With reference to surface damages Form 193 (Rev. 12/1954)
Colorado Oil and Gas Lease, contains the following language:
"Lessee shall be liable and agrees to pay for all damages
to the surface of the land, livestock, growing crops, or im-
provements caused by lessee's operations on said lands.
It is agreed and understood that no operations shall be
commenced on the lands hereinabove described unless and
until the lessee or his assignee shall have filed a good and
sufficient bond with the lessor in an amount to be fixed
by lessor, to secure the payment for such damage to the
21272 P. 633 (1928).
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surface of the land, livestock, growing crops or improve-
ments as may be caused by lessee or his assignee's opera-
tions of said lands and also compliance with all the pro-
visions, conditions, covenants and obligations of this lease
and the statutes of the State of Colorado, and rules and
regulations thereto appertaining. When requested by lessor,
lessee shall bury pipe lines below plow depth."
This language goes beyond the language contained in the
usual fee lease or in a federal oil and gas lease. The Colorado
Supreme Court has not ruled upon a question of liability for dam-
ages under the provisions of the state lease form. However, the
Supreme Court of New Mexico had occasion to interpret similar
language contained in a New Mexico state lease form .22 In the Tide-
water case, Shipp had obtained a state oil and gas lease. The oil
operator began the conduct of seismographing operations on the
premises and the plaintiff obtained a restraining order prohibit-
ing the conduct of such operations.
Despite the restraining order the defendant oil operator con-
tinued with the seismographing work. No damage was dorie to
any crops or improvements. However, trucks did travel over the
grazing surface of the land. The court allowed the plaintiff to re-
cover for damage to the grazing surface and for loss of weight
incurred by his cattle which was attributed to their being dis-
turbed by the conduct of the oil lessee's operations.
In summary, the "so called" general rule may be said to be
that the owner of the dominant mineral estate may use any means
reasonably necessary or reasonably incident to obtain the bene-
fits of his estate, and that in the absence of negligence, he will
not be liable for any damage caused to the surface owner unless
such damages are provided for in the lease contract. Therefore,
an understanding and an agreement upon the terms of the lease
contract are of vital importance. This, coupled with a genuine
desire on the part of the parties involved to act in strict accord-
ance with business ethics and to conduct their activities in a man-
ner which will interfere with the activities of the owner of the
other estate in the least possible way, will do more than any other
measure to alleviate the problem of surface damages.
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